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1 Introduction
How political leaders should be chosen and whether they can be trusted to act in the pub-
lic’s best interest is a question of natural concern and relevance. Elections are a widely used
mechanism to allow people to select the political leaders they perceive as best suited to govern.
However, the very fact that the incumbent head of government is reelected if he is perceived as
better suited to govern than his challenger may induce him to choose socially costly policies if
this allows him to shape the voters’ perception in a favorable way. We provide a model in which
in equilibrium elections lead to an incumbency advantage that stems from inefficient policies in
a policy dimension in which the incumbent is known to be stronger than his challenger. To the
best of our knowledge, the mechanism that generates an incumbency advantage in our model
is novel, and so are its empirical predictions.
The main ingredients of the model are the following: The incumbent knows the state of
the world, say the threat from criminals, whereas the voters do not. The preferences of the
voters are such that under complete information they would elect the candidate who is known
to be better at fighting crime, but potentially worse in other dimensions, if and only if the
threat from criminals is above a certain threshold level. The incumbent can choose to fight
crime efficiently or not. The voters do not observe this policy choice, but they do observe the
resulting policy outcome, say the crime rate. The incumbent dislikes high crime rates like the
voters do, but he also has a preference for staying in office. Therefore, he may be willing to
trade off higher crime rates for improvements in his reelection chances.
In equilibrium the incumbent always chooses efficient policies if he is known to be weaker
in fighting crime than his challenger because his strategic incentives are well aligned with the
common interest in efficient policies and low crime rates. The more interesting situation arises
if the incumbent is stronger than the challenger in fighting crime. In equilibrium such an
incumbent also employs efficient policies both in high states in which crime is a very serious
issue and in low states in which crime is only a minor problem. Observing the resulting crime
rate, the voters correctly infer whether the state is above or below the threshold level, and
they reelect the incumbent in the high states, but not in the low states. However, unless the
incumbent’s preference for staying in office is weak, the incumbent chooses inefficient policies
in intermediate states. Observing intermediate levels of the crime rate, the voters can therefore
not tell whether this crime rate is the result of the use of inefficient policies when the threat
from criminals is moderately low or of the use of efficient policies when this threat is moderately
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high. However, in these instances the voters’ beliefs have been targeted by the incumbent in
such a way that their expected utility of reelecting him exceeds their expected utility of electing
the challenger. In equilibrium the incumbent is therefore reelected whenever he uses inefficient
policies, and he is (re)elected more often than he would be if his challenger had been in office,
or if the voters were fully informed. Hence the incumbent enjoys an incumbency advantage
that is due to inefficient policies and asymmetric information.
One of the two main predictions of our model is the presence of an incumbency advantage.
There is a substantial empirical literature finding a sizable and robust electoral advantage of
incumbents over challengers (e.g. Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2002; Ansolabehere et al., 2006).
The other main prediction is that prior to elections office-motivated incumbents should some-
times implement policies inefficiently. In particular, they should do so in policy dimensions
in which they are perceived to be strong and in ways that may not be observed by most vot-
ers.1 Our discussion focuses on examples in the fields of national security, where right-wing
parties are perceived to be strong, and poverty and unemployment, where left-wing parties are
considered to be strong (e.g. Petrocik, 1996).
In their study on terrorism and electoral outcomes in Israel, Berrebi and Klor (2006) provide
evidence that the support for right-wing parties increases in the number of terror attacks, and
show that right-wing incumbents impose total or partial closures on Westbank or Gaza much
less frequently before elections than left-wing incumbents. These findings are consistent with
the notion that prior to elections right-wing incumbents take less precautions against terror
attacks than left-wing incumbents even though they have the reputation of being tougher.
Similarly, nationalist parties tend to benefit politically from communal or ethnic riots involving
minorities. Wilkinson (2004, 2009) shows that Indian right-wing parties had electoral gains from
riots between Hindus and Muslims and that in areas controlled by right-wing parties such as
the Hindu nationalist BJP before elections police action to stop riots was inefficient. Wilkinson
finds that controlling a riot does not only depend on the police budget, but also largely on
“whether the police will be deployed quickly, and with sufficient will or force” and whether it
is “given sufficient direction by their political masters” (Wilkinson, 2009: 336). He argues that
similar inefficient anti-riot policies by nationalist parties took place in Ireland, Malaysia and
Romania.
1It is not necessary that the state of the world and the inefficiency are unobservable with certainty or at any
cost, but that with some positive probability they are unobserved by most voters. This is consistent with the
empirical evidence that voters are generally rather ill-informed about facts relevant to politics (see e.g. Bartels,
1996, or Blendon et al., 1997).
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According to our model, left-wing politicians known to be strong at fighting poverty and
unemployment may sometimes choose inefficient policies to improve their electoral prospects.
Examples include the “populist” macroeconomic policies implemented by various Latin Ameri-
can governments in recent decades. According to Dornbusch and Edwards (1990: 247) allegedly
redistributive “populist policies do ultimately fail; and when they fail it is always at a frighten-
ing cost to the very groups who were supposed to be favored.” Our paper suggests that rather
than being based on “bad” economics such inefficient policies may have been based on “good”
Machiavellian politics.
Our paper is related to the literature on issue ownership (Budge and Farlie, 1983; Petrocik,
1996), with which it shares the two main premises that a given party “owns” some issues for
which it is perceived as strong, and that electoral support depends on what issues are consid-
ered salient before the election. Hence the parties have incentives to make the voters believe
that “their” issues are particularly pressing. While the existing issue ownership literature is
essentially empirical and focuses on campaigning by both candidates to affect issue salience
(e.g. Petrocik et al., 2003), in our framework the incumbent has an informational advantage
and can use inefficient policies to manipulate beliefs on issue salience. Hence, our model yields
an incumbency advantage that cannot be explained by issue ownership in campaigning.
Our paper is also closely related to the contributions of Rogoff and Sibert (1988; see also
Rogoff, 1990), Canes-Wrone et al. (2001), and Shi and Svensson (2006), who all study games
between voters and an incumbent whose competence is unknown to voters.2 This incumbent
can use inefficient policies to appear more competent than he is and, thereby, improve his
reelection chances. In contrast to this existing work, the focus of our paper lies on situations in
which voters would like to base their voting decision on the unknown state of the world, rather
than the unknown type of the incumbent. This gives rise to a setting with partisan differences
in which left- and right-wing incumbents face different incentives depending on the relevant
policy dimension.
There are other substantial differences between our model and the one of Rogoff and Sibert
(1988). They assume that the incumbent has private information about his competence, but
2See Besley (2007) for an excellent overview of models of reelections. Our paper is further related to Alesina
and Cukierman (1990), Coate and Morris (1995), and Dellis (2009). Alesina and Cukierman present a model
similar to Rogoff and Sibert in which the incumbent has private information about his policy preferences. Coate
and Morris show that an incumbent may choose inefficient ways of redistribution to special interest groups to
conceal his type. Dellis presents a model in which prior to election the incumbent may not address salient issues
on which the voters like his stance.
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is imperfectly informed about the preferences of the median voter. For any level of expected
competence, he has better reelection chances when choosing inefficient rather than efficient
policies. His equilibrium strategy is thus fully separating and revealing. Hence in equilibrium
he has no incumbency advantage. In our model, the incumbent knows the median voter’s
preferences. He thus has no incentive to choose inefficient policies in low or high states, i.e. when
he cannot affect the election outcome. As a result, his equilibrium strategy is partially pooling
and he enjoys an incumbency advantage.3
Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) study leadership and pandering by incumbents in a model with
binary states, binary incumbent types and binary policies. In equilibrium an incompetent
incumbent may use inefficient policies when elections are relatively close, and only when the
equilibrium is in mixed strategies. As a consequence, there is no clear incumbency advan-
tage, and the incumbent is sometimes not reelected even when the voters would be better off
reelecting him, which cannot happen in our model.
In line with the career concerns model of Holmstro¨m (1999), Shi and Svensson (2006)
assume that the incumbent faces the same uncertainty about his competence when choosing
his policy as the voters do when casting their votes. In equilibrium the incumbent chooses an
inefficient policy but cannot improve his reelection prospects as the voters expect him to do
so. If the incumbent knew as little as the voters about the true state of the world, our model
would yield a similar result: The incumbent might choose an inefficient policy, but the voters
would anticipate his policy choice and could correctly infer the true state. The incumbent’s
informational advantage is therefore necessary for the incumbency advantage to arise in our
model, but not for inefficient equilibrium policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the model. Section
3 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 4 discusses our results, and Section 5 concludes. The
appendix contains longer proofs.
2 The Model
There are two candidates, A and B, and two periods t = 1, 2. This is the simplest structure that
allows for reelection and hence the possibility of incumbency advantage. For now we assume
3Two technical comments are in order: First, there also exist pooling equilibria in Rogoff and Sibert’s model,
but Rogoff and Sibert discard them on the ground that they do not satisfy the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion. The
partially pooling equilibrium of our model satisfies the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion. Second, the equilibrium in
our model is robust to the introduction of uncertainty with respect to the median voter’s preferences, provided
this uncertainty is small.
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that one of these candidates is in office for exogenous reasons in period one. The candidate in
office is called the incumbent, the other candidate is called the challenger. At the end of period
one, the (median) voter M either reelects the incumbent or replaces him by the challenger.
Throughout the paper we refer to an incumbent as “he” and to the voter as “she”. Since there
are two types of incumbents, A and B, there are two versions of this game differing in the
incumbent’s type. In each version, there are three players: the incumbent, the challenger, and
the voter.
Information: Information is asymmetric in that in each period the state of the world z is
known to the candidates, but not to the voter. For simplicity, the state is assumed to be time
invariant. We assume that z ∈ R is a random draw from the commonly known distribution
F (z) whose density f(z) is continuous and strictly positive for all z. The voter’s prior belief
μ(z) that state z has been realized therefore satisfies μ(z) = f(z). The voter observes the policy
outcome yt in period t, which depends both on z and the action undertaken by the incumbent.
One can think of z as the severity of an international economic crisis and yt as the national
unemployment rate. Alternatively, one can think of z as the number of potential delinquents
and yt as the number of crimes committed.
Timing and Actions: Having learned the state z at the beginning of period one, the in-
cumbent chooses between low and high quality policies q1 ∈ {q, q}, with q < q. This choice
does not involve any direct cost. The quality q1 can be thought of as measuring the efficiency
with which the incumbent tackles unemployment, or alternatively as the efficiency with which
police are employed to fight crime. At the end of period one, but prior to election day, the voter
observes the policy outcome y1, but not the incumbent’s choice of q1. She then updates her
beliefs about the true state and either reelects the incumbent or elects the challenger. In period
two, the policy outcome y2 is realized after the (re)elected candidate’s choice of q2 ∈ {q, q},
and then the game ends.
Technology: In each period, the policy outcome yt depends on the state z, the quality qt
and the candidate in office i ∈ {A,B} as follows:
yt = y(qt, z, i), (1)
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where y(.) satisfies 0 < y(qt, z, A) < y(qt, z, B) for any qt and z, and y(q, z, i) < y(q, z, i) for
any z and i. Hence, the policy outcome is lower when A is in office and when high quality
policies are chosen. Moreover, we assume that y(qt, z, i) is continuous and increasing in z and
satisfies 0 < ∂y(qt, z, A)/∂z < ∂y(qt, z, B)/∂z for any qt and z. This latter assumption implies
that an increase in state z has a stronger effect on the policy outcome yt if B is in office than
if A is in office.
Payoffs: The voter prefers a low policy outcome yt to a high one, and she gets some exoge-
nous benefit θi from having candidate i ∈ {A,B} in office. Her instantaneous von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility with candidate i in office and policy outcome yt is
ωt = θi − c(yt), (2)
where c(yt) is continuous and satisfies c
′(yt) > 0 and c′′(yt) ≥ 0. Hence, high crime or unem-
ployment rates decrease utility. We assume θA < θB. While candidate A is better at fighting
the undesired policy outcome, the voter thus benefits from having candidate B in office for
some other reason, e.g., because B is better in some policy dimension in which there is no
quality choice.4 As a tie-breaking rule, we further assume that the voter elects A if she is
indifferent between the two candidates. Using (1) and (2), we can write the voter’s indirect
utility in state z with quality qt and candidate i in office as
u(qt, z, i) = θi − c(y(qt, z, i)). (3)
Observe that u(q, z, i) > u(q, z, i) for all z and both i because y(q, z, i) < y(q, z, i) and c′(yt) > 0.
Candidates are office- as well as policy-motivated. The instantaneous utility of each candi-
date j ∈ {A,B} is Ψ+ u(qt, z, i) if in office (i.e. if j = i), and u(qt, z, i) otherwise, where Ψ ≥ 0
measures their office rent. For simplicity, we assume that utility is additively separable over
time and we abstract from discounting.
Solution Concept: The solution concept we employ is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE).
We restrict our attention to PBE in pure strategies, and we add the following restriction on the
voter’s off equilibrium beliefs: When observing a policy outcome y1 that cannot result from the
4In a web appendix, we present an extended version of our model with two policy dimensions in which there is
a quality choice. We assume that each candidate is stronger than his challenger in one of the two dimensions. We
find that any incumbent can use his informational advantage and low quality policies in the policy dimension in
which he is stronger to sometimes manipulate the voter into reelecting him when doing so is not in her interest.
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incumbent having played his equilibrium strategy, the voter has “Laplacian” beliefs, i.e., she
assumes that the incumbent may have played the “wrong” q1 with the same error probability
at each state z consistent with y1. This implies that the voter’s off equilibrium beliefs over the
states consistent with the observed outcome y1 must be proportional to her prior beliefs over
these states.5
3 The Equilibrium
The quality q2 that the office holder chooses in period two is straightforward to determine:
Since there are no strategic incentives, and since u(q, z, i) > u(q, z, i) for any z and i, the office
holder i ∈ {A,B} chooses high quality q for all z in period two.
Having solved the period two subgame, we focus on period one in the remainder of this
section. We start by deriving who the voter would elect under full information, i.e., if she knew
the true state z. The difference between her utility in period two when A is in office and when
B is in office is
Δu(z) ≡ u(q, z, A)− u(q, z, B). (4)
This difference Δu(z) increases in z because the benefit of having A in office, who is better at
reducing the undesired policy outcome y2, increases in z, while the benefit of having B in office,
θB − θA, is independent of z. The threshold value z˜ that makes the voter indifferent between
A and B is implicitly defined by Δu(z˜) = 0. It follows:
Lemma 1 Under full information the voter would elect A if z ≥ z˜, and B otherwise.
However, the voter does not know the true state z and can only base her decision on the
observed policy outcome y1 and her updated beliefs μ(z|y1). We discuss next how the Bayesian
updating and the optimal behavior of the voter depend on y1 and the incumbent’s strategy.
We then derive the optimal policy choice of the two types of incumbents i ∈ {A,B}.
Given an incumbent of type i, any observed policy outcome y1 is in principle consistent
with two different states z. Denote by z(y1) the state consistent with quality q and observation
y1, and by z(y1) the state consistent with q and y1. That is, given i, z(y1) and z(y1) are defined
5Laplacian off equilibrium beliefs can be justified on both technical and intuitive grounds: It can be shown
that in our setup imposing Laplacian off equilibrium beliefs is equivalent to imposing the Perfect Sequential
Equilibrium refinement of Grossman and Perry (1986). Moreover, such prior preserving beliefs seem a plausible
assumption, as whenever off equilibrium observations are possible the incumbent can in principle gain from an
off-the-equilibrium path deviation at any state consistent with this observation.
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by
y1 = y(q, z(y1), i) and y1 = y(q, z(y1), i). (5)
Our assumptions on y(qt, z, i) imply that z(y1) < z(y1), and that both z(y1) and z(y1) are
continuous and increasing in y1. The property that no state other than z(y1) and z(y1) is a
priori consistent with an observed y1 restricts the voter’s beliefs μ(z|y1) substantially because
it implies μ(z(y1)|y1) + μ(z(y1)|y1) = 1.
Given an observed policy outcome y1, the voter elects A if
μ(z(y1)|y1)Δu(z(y1)) + μ(z(y1)|y1)Δu(z(y1)) ≥ 0, (6)
and B otherwise. Her decision problem is straightforward when only one state z is consistent
with the observed y1 given the incumbent’s strategy. This is the case when the incumbent
plays high quality q in both of the technically possible states z(y1) and z(y1). Then, the voter’s
belief is μ(z(y1)|y1) = 1 and she elects A if and only if y1 ≥ yL, where yL is the unique outcome
that satisfies Δu(z(yL)) = 0. Similarly, when the incumbent plays low quality q in both z(y1)
and z(y1), the voter’s belief is μ(z(y1)|y1) = 1 and she elects A if and only if y1 ≥ yH , where
yH is such that Δu(z(yH)) = 0.6
However, the voter cannot infer the true state z after observing the policy outcome y1 if
the incumbent plays q at z(y1) and q at z(y1). Bayesian updating implies that she elects A if
and only if
f(z(y1))Δu(z(y1)) + f(z(y1))Δu(z(y1)) ≥ 0. (7)
Now, for any y1 ≤ yL she elects B because Δu(z(y1)) < Δu(z(y1)) ≤ 0. Similarly, for any
y1 ≥ yH she elects A because 0 ≤ Δu(z(y1)) < Δu(z(y1)). For y1 ∈ (yL, yH) her decision
problem is more involved since she would be better off with B in state z(y1) and with A in
state z(y1). We know that the left-hand side of (7) is continuous for all y1, strictly negative for
y1 = y
L and strictly positive for y1 = y
H . Thus, there exists some y′ ∈ (yL, yH) such that (7)
holds with equality. In general there may exist multiple thresholds satisfying this condition,
but for simplicity we assume from here onwards that y′ is unique.7 When observing y1 and
assuming that the incumbent plays q at z(y1) and q at z(y1), the voter thus elects A if and
only if y1 ≥ y′. It is useful to define z′ ≡ z(y′) and z′ ≡ z(y′). Observe that z′ < z˜ < z′.
6Equivalently yL and yH can be defined as the outcomes that satisfy z(yL) = z˜ = z(yH).
7A sufficient condition for y′ to be unique (that is far from being tight) is that f(z) is constant in the interval
[z(yL), z(yH)]. None of our main results is qualitatively affected if y′ is not unique.
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The intuition for the voter’s behavior, taking the incumbent’s strategy as given, is the
following: Whenever y1 is close to y
H , she knows that the true state is either close to z˜, in
which case she will be somewhat better off with B, or close to z(yH), in which case she will be
much better off with A. She thus elects A. Conversely, she elects B when y1 is close to y
L as
she will either be much better off with B or slightly better off with A.
Next, we focus on the equilibrium strategy of the two types of incumbents, A and B. Any
incumbent knows that the voter elects B for any y1 < y
L and A for any y1 ≥ yH , independently
of her beliefs μ(z(y1)|y1). Consequently, when z < zL ≡ z(yL) or z ≥ zH ≡ z(yH), any
incumbent chooses high quality q because he cannot influence the election outcome.
With an incumbent of type B it is easy to see that there exists an equilibrium in which he
plays high quality q for all z: If the voter expects B to play q for all z, she correctly infers the
state z from the observed policy outcome y1 and elects B if and only if y1 < y
L. Given this
strategy of the voter, B has no incentive to deviate and to play low quality q because this would
lead to a higher policy outcome y1 without improving his reelection prospects. Indeed, playing
q would make the voter think that the state z is higher than it actually is, which would even
cost B his reelection when z ∈ [zL, z˜). As shown in Appendix A, this equilibrium is unique.
Summarizing, we therefore have:8
Proposition 1 The game with incumbent B has a unique PBE in which B plays q for all z
in period one, and the voter reelects B for y1 < y
L and elects A otherwise.
This proposition implies that an incumbent who is weak in the relevant policy dimension would
never choose low quality policies. The reason is that his strategic incentives are well aligned
with the common interest in a low policy outcome. The voter can therefore always correctly
infer the true state of the world. As under full information, she reelects B if and only if z < z˜.
The equilibrium with incumbent A may look differently because his strategic incentives
conflict with the common interest in a low policy outcome. To see that a fully separating
equilibrium may not exist, assume that the voter expects A to play high quality q for all z.
In this case A is not reelected when playing q in states z ∈ [zL, z˜), but he would be reelected
when playing q instead. Whether A plays q in some states depends on his office rent Ψ.
The immediate costs of low quality are u(q, z, A) − u(q, z, A). The benefit from staying in
office because of low quality is Ψ + u(q, z, A)− u(q, z, B). Hence the benefit exceeds the costs
8Observe that our restriction on off equilibrium beliefs plays no role in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 below.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium with incumbent A and Ψ > Ψ.
if and only if Ψ > Ψˆ(z) ≡ u(q, z, B) − u(q, z, A). The notation Ψ ≡ minz∈[zL,z′] Ψˆ(z) and
Ψ ≡ maxz∈[zL,z′] Ψˆ(z) is useful below.
An equilibrium in which incumbent A plays high quality q for all z exists only if Ψ ≤ Ψˆ(z)
for all z ∈ [zL, z˜). Then A has no incentive to deviate if the voter expects him to play q for
all z. As shown in Appendix A, this equilibrium is unique if Ψ ≤ Ψ. We therefore have the
following result:
Proposition 2 For Ψ ≤ Ψ, the game with incumbent A has a unique PBE in which A plays
q for all z in period one, and the voter reelects A for y1 ≥ yL and elects B otherwise.
Hence, when always choosing high quality q, incumbent A is also reelected if and only if z ≥ z˜.
However, there exists no equilibrium in which incumbent A plays high quality q for all z
if his office rent Ψ is relatively large, as he would want to deviate and play low quality q for
z ∈ [zL, z˜). This leads us to our main result:
Proposition 3 For Ψ > Ψ, the game with incumbent A has a unique PBE with Laplacian off
equilibrium beliefs, in which A plays q for z ∈ [z′, z′) and q for any other z in period one, and
the voter reelects A for y1 ≥ y′ and elects B otherwise.
This proposition is illustrated in Figure 1. Incumbent A’s strategy as a function of z is high-
lighted with bold lines, and the voter’s strategy is indicated on the vertical axis. It is easy to
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see that incumbent A has no incentive to deviate given the equilibrium strategy of the voter
and Ψ > Ψ. He plays q if the election outcome is independent of his quality choice, but q if
doing so ensures his reelection whereas he would not be reelected when playing q. By defini-
tion of y′, the voter is better off in expectation electing A for observations y1 ∈ [y′, y(q, z′, A))
even though she cannot infer the true state z. The observations y1 ∈ [y(q, z′, A), y′) are off
the equilibrium path, but our assumption of Laplacian off equilibrium beliefs implies that the
voter would optimally elect B for these observations.9
4 Discussion
In this section, we look at A’s incumbency advantage and the welfare effects of elections, and
we discuss why candidate A could become the incumbent in the first place.
Incumbency Advantage: Proposition 3 shows that incumbent A is reelected for all z ≥ z′
if Ψ > Ψ. Since z′ < z˜, he is reelected in strictly more states than he would be under full
information. From Proposition 1 we further know that as the challenger, A is elected for any
z ≥ z˜. Hence, A’s incumbency advantage, defined as the increase in his ex ante reelection
probability due to incumbency, is F (z˜) − F (z′) > 0.10 When observing y1 ∈ [y′, yH) and
reelecting A, the voter is of course aware that the true state is z(y1) < z˜ with probability
f(z(y1))/(f(z(y1))+f(z(y1))), and that in this case she would be better off electingB. However,
incumbent A only induces the voter to remain uncertain if she is then in expectation better off
reelecting him than electing B.
Welfare Effects of Elections: Two inefficiencies arise from the voter’s perspective when A
is the incumbent and Ψ > Ψ. First, she may end up with A in office for another period while
she would be better off with B. Her ex ante expected welfare loss due to this inefficiency is
WA ≡ −
∫ z˜
z′ Δu(z)f(z)dz, which is strictly positive since Δu(z) < 0 for z < z˜, and increasing in
9The role of our restriction on off equilibrium beliefs is to pick a unique equilibrium. In the absence of this
restriction, there exist multiple PBE if Ψ > Ψˆ(z) holds for some z ∈ [z′, zH ] as well. However, all PBE share the
same structure in that A plays q only for some intermediate z and is always reelected when doing so. Note that
all PBE satisfy the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion, and all (but one) exhibit an incumbency advantage. Further
note that if Ψ ∈ (Ψ,Ψ], A may in equilibrium play q for some, but not all z ∈ [z′, z′); and the voter may therefore
again reelect him for some z < z˜.
10This definition of incumbency advantage is the same as the one advocated by Bevia´ and Llavador (2009).
In our setup, the incumbency advantage coincides with the difference between A’s reelection probability as
incumbent with an informational advantage and his (hypothetical) reelection probability under full information.
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the likelihood of states in [z′, z˜].11 The second inefficiency from the voter’s perspective is that
she has to bear the costs of low quality policies in period one when z ∈ [z′, z′). This inefficiency
leads to an ex ante expected welfare loss of Wq ≡
∫ z′
z′ [u(q, z, A) − u(q, z, A)]f(z)dz > 0. This
expected welfare loss increases in the likelihood of states in [z′, z′]. It also tends to be the
larger, the stronger the effect of the incumbent’s policy choice q1 on the policy outcome y1.
Given these inefficiencies and assuming Ψ > Ψ, the question arises whether the election at
the end of period one is improving the voter’s welfare at all compared to a situation in which
the incumbent can stay in office for sure. In the simple case in which the incumbent is of type
B, the voter’s expected benefit from replacing incumbent B when she is indeed better off with
challenger A in office equals
∫∞
z˜ Δu(z)f(z)dz > 0. This benefit from the selection effect of
elections is always positive and obviously larger when states z ≥ z˜ are more likely. There is
also a positive selection effect of elections when the incumbent is of type A. However, this
effect is mitigated by the two inefficiencies just discussed. Elections are thus welfare improving




Δu(z)f(z)dz −WA −Wq ≥ 0.
This net benefit of elections is the larger, the lower the likelihood of states in [z˜, z′) and the
higher the likelihood of states below z′.
Endogenizing the Incumbent’s Type: A related question is how candidate A could have
become the incumbent in the first place if Ψ > Ψ, given that his behavior may result in various
inefficiencies. So suppose that there is a pre-stage to our game, in which the voter can choose
whether A or B becomes the incumbent in period one without having any insights about z
other than its distribution F (z). Given Ψ > Ψ, the voter prefers having A as incumbent if and
only if ∫ ∞
−∞
Δu(z)f(z)dz −WA −Wq ≥ 0.
The first term is the voter’s expected benefit of having A in office instead of B, under the
hypothesis that both types of incumbents use efficient policies; and the other two terms are
the inefficiencies associated with incumbent A. If the hypothetical benefit is negative, the
voter obviously chooses B as incumbent. Interestingly, however, if this benefit is positive and
sufficiently large, the voter chooses A as incumbent despite the inefficiencies WA and Wq.
11To be precise, WA is higher with distribution F1(z) than with F2(z) if the corresponding densities satisfy
f1(z) > f2(z) for all z ∈ [z′, z˜), assuming that F1(z) and F2(z) lead to the same z′ and z′. Subsequent statements
about higher or lower likelihood of states z in some interval are to be understood analogously.
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5 Conclusions
We have analyzed a model with strategic interactions between an incumbent office holder
and voters who observe neither the state of the world nor whether the incumbent uses policy
instruments efficiently or inefficiently. When the incumbent has a sufficiently strong desire to
stay in office, he employs inefficient policies for some intermediate states in the policy dimension
in which he is considered to be stronger than his challenger. Whenever the incumbent does
so in equilibrium, the voters reelect him even though they would not reelect him for some of
these states if they observed the state or the policy chosen, or if he were the challenger. Thus,
the incumbent enjoys an incumbency advantage due to inefficient policies and asymmetric
information. Since all types of incumbent employ efficient policies for non-intermediate states
of the world, these states are revealed, which allows the voters to elect their preferred candidate.
Therefore, in equilibrium elections have both a selection and an inefficiency inducing effect.
As right-wing candidates are perceived to be stronger at, for example, fighting crime and
terrorism while left-wing candidates are perceived to be stronger at, say, fighting poverty and
unemployment, our model predicts partisan differences in deliberate inefficiencies: At times,
right-wing incumbents should fight crime and terrorism inefficiently while left-wing incumbents
should sometimes be deliberately inefficient at curbing poverty and unemployment.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Because c′(y) > 0, c′′(y) ≥ 0, y(qt, z, A) < y(qt, z, B) and 0 <
∂y(qt, z, A)/∂z < ∂y(qt, z, B)/∂z, Δu(z) is strictly increasing in z. Continuity of c(y) in y
and of y(q, z, i) in z imply that Δu(z) is continuous in z. Hence, there exists a unique z˜, and
Δu(z) ≥ 0 if and only if z ≥ z˜. 
Proof of the uniqueness part of Proposition 1: Since the voter always elects A for
y1 ≥ yH and B for y1 ≤ yL, it follows that B is never reelected when playing q in states z ≥ z˜,
but always when playing q in states z < z˜. Consequently, there exists no z such that B is
reelected when playing q while A is elected when playing q. Since playing q moreover leads to
lower costs c(y1), there can be no equilibrium in which B plays q for some z. 
Proof of the uniqueness part of Proposition 2: We know that A plays q for z < zL and
z ≥ zH . Further, given Ψ ≤ Ψ, A also plays q for any z ∈ [zL, z′). Given this, there can be no
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equilibrium in which A plays q for z ∈ [z′, zH) since it would then pay for A to deviate and to
play q, as this would still lead to his reelection by definition of y′ and z′. Hence, there can be
no equilibrium in which A plays q for some z. 
Proof of Proposition 3: The proof has two parts. We first prove that the strategy profile and
the beliefs consistent with it constitute a PBE that satisfies our restriction on off equilibrium
beliefs. Second, we show that there exists no other PBE in pure strategies that satisfies this
restriction. For notational ease, we set μ(z|y1) ≡ μ(z(y1)|y1). Remember that μ(z(y1)|y1) =
1− μ(z|y1).
Part I (Existence): First, we show that A does not want to deviate given the voter’s strategy.
For z < z′, the voter elects B for any q1. Hence q is A’s best response. For z ∈ [z′, z′), the
voter reelects A if and only if he plays q. Hence q is A’s best response given Ψ > Ψ. For z ≥ z′,
the voter reelects A for any q1. Hence q is A’s best response.
Second, we show that on equilibrium the voter’s beliefs are updated according to Bayes’
rule and consistent with A’s strategy. Given A’s strategy, observations y1 < y(q, z
′, A) are
only consistent with A having played q. Hence, μ(z|y1) = 0 for such observations. Given A’s
strategy and observations y1 ∈ [y′, y(q, z′, A)), μ(z|y1) = f(z(y1))f(z(y1))+f(z(y1)) by Bayes’ rule. Given
A’s strategy, observations y1 ≥ y(q, z′, A) are only consistent with A having played q. Hence,
μ(z|y1) = 0 for such observations.
Third, we derive the voter’s beliefs off equilibrium. Any observation y1 ∈ [y(q, z′, A), y′)
is consistent with q being played in state z(y1) and q being played in state z(y1), both of
which are not played on equilibrium. Let ε > 0 be the probability that such an “error” occurs




Fourth, we show that the voter’s strategy is optimal given her beliefs. Given y1 < y(q, z
′, A)
and beliefs μ(z|y1) = 0, electing B is obviously her best response. Given y1 ∈ [y(q, z′, A), y′)
and beliefs μ(z|y1) = f(z(y1))f(z(y1))+f(z(y1)) , electing B is her best response by definition of y′ (and our
assumption that y′ is unique). Given y1 ∈ [y′, y(q, z′, A)) and beliefs μ(z|y1) = f(z(y1))f(z(y1))+f(z(y1)) ,
electing A is her best response by definition of y′. Given y1 ≥ y(q, z′, A) and beliefs μ(z|y1) = 0,
electing A is again her best response. This completes the proof of the existence part.
Part II (Uniqueness): The discussion in the text rules out any alternative equilibrium strategies
for z < zL and z ≥ zH . Claims 3.1 to 3.4 below rule out all alternative candidate equilibrium
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strategies in the interval [zL, zH).
Claim 3.1: For any pair (z(y1), z(y1)) ∈ [zL, z˜) × [z˜, zH), there is no equilibrium in which A
plays q at z(y1) and z(y1).
Proof: Suppose he would. Then, the voter’s beliefs are μ(z|y1) = 0 when observing y1 =
y(q, z(y1), A) or y1 = y(q, z(y1), A). She thus elects B if y1 = y(q, z(y1), A), and reelects A if
y1 = y(q, z(y1), A). Given this strategy of the voter, and since y(q, z(y1), A) = y(q, z(y1), A)
and Ψ > Ψ, A has an incentive to deviate and to play q in state z(y1).
Claim 3.2: For any pair (z(y1), z(y1)) ∈ [zL, z˜) × [z˜, zH), there is no equilibrium in which A
plays q at z(y1) and z(y1).
Proof: Suppose he would. Then, the voter’s beliefs are μ(z|y1) = 1 when observing y1 =
y(q, z(y1), A) or y1 = y(q, z(y1), A). She thus elects B if y1 = y(q, z(y1), A), and reelects A if
y1 = y(q, z(y1), A). Given this strategy of the voter, A has an incentive to deviate and to play
q in state z(y1) because he is not reelected anyway and c
′(y1) > 0.
Claim 3.3: For any pair (z(y1), z(y1)) ∈ [zL, z′) × [z˜, z′), there is no equilibrium in which A
plays q in state z(y1) and q in state z(y1).
Proof: By definition of y′, when observing y1 = y(q, z(y1), A) = y(q, z(y1), A) < y′, the voter
elects B. Hence, in state z(y1) A would have an incentive to deviate and to play q, as this
would improve the policy outcome without affecting the probability of reelection. Moreover,
in state z(y1) A would also have an incentive to deviate and to play q, which would lead to
y1 > y
H and therefore ensure his reelection.
Claim 3.4: For any pair (z(y1), z(y1)) ∈ [z′, z˜)×[z′, zH), there is no equilibrium in which A plays
q in state z(y1) and q in state z(y1) and which satisfies our restriction on the off equilibrium
beliefs.
Proof: Suppose A plays q in state z(y1) and q in state z(y1). Then the voter elects B when
observing y1 = y(q, z(y1), A). To prevent A from deviating and playing q in state z(y1), the
voter must elect B also when observing y1 = y(q, z(y1), A) ≥ y′. For electing B to be optimal
given her beliefs, it must hold that μ(z|y1) > f(z(y1))f(z(y1))+f(z(y1)) by construction of y′ (and since
y1 ≥ y′). However, as shown in part I of the proof, the only off equilibrium beliefs consistent
with our restriction are μ(z|y1) = f(z(y1))f(z(y1))+f(z(y1)) . 
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